








DOES FEMALE PARTICIPATION 

















Editor: Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. 
Primera Edición Abril 2007 
Depósito Legal: V-1904-2007 
  
IVIE working papers offer in advance the results of economic research under way in order to 




                                                 
 
* The paper benefited from the comments and discussion by César Alonso, Dolores Collado and Aurora García-
Gallego. Financial support by the Spanish Ministry of Education (project SEJ2005-02829/ECON) is gratefully 
acknowledged. I remain responsible for all errors and omissions. 
 
** Departament d’Economia. Universitat Jaume I, Campus Riu Sec, E-12071 Castellón (Spain). Tel: 
+34964387166. Fax: +34964728591. E-mail: zamoram@eco.uji.es   2
 
 









Using Spanish data I test whether there is a different pattern of intra-household 
distribution between two types of families: on the one hand, families with both spouses 
in full time employment and, on the other hand, families with the husband in full time 
employment and the wife being outside the labor market. Significant differences are 
found in such a pattern and some of its features are identified and estimated.  
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 1. Introduction
The traditional sociological view is that the Spanish family is ruled by a paterfamilias
who acts as a supreme decision maker and administrator of the pooled resources of the
family members (Moreno, 2003). This view is close to the traditional unitary economic
model of the household as a single decision maker. Nevertheless, empirical evidence rejects
the restrictions imposed by the unitary model. In particular, the rejection of the Income
Pooling Hypothesis is common, according to which only total family income, and not its
distribution across members, matters for labor supply and consumption decisions (see
Lundberg and Pollak (1996) for a survey). Furthermore, as remarked in Blundell et al.
(2001), the unitary model implies “...that if an individual is at a corner solution, it is the
reservation wage of that individual rather than the market wage that aﬀects the labor
supply of the partner. As in the case of the income pooling assumption, this is far from
innocuous, implying as it does that the value of paid work as an ‘outside option’ for a
nonparticipant does not inﬂuence the allocation of consumption and leisure within the
household”(p.2).
I provide herein additional empirical evidence against the traditional view of the Span-
ish family. To tackle this problem I compare the distribution of resources between the
spouses in two types of families. On the one hand, traditional families considered as those
families in which the wife does not participate in the labor market and, on the other hand,
modern families considered as those in which the wife participates.
It is well-known that the identiﬁcation of the intra-household distribution can only
be done by modelling the household outcomes as the result of many people’s (at least two
adults) decisions. Amongst the many models suggested, empirical evidence supports to the
collective model for several countries. This model posits that however decisions are made,
the outcomes are Pareto eﬃcient (see Chiappori (1988, 1992) and Browning and Chiappori
(1998) for the basic theory). The pattern of intra-household distribution is known as “the
sharing rule” in this family of collective models.The starting point of the present work is the basic collective model of Chiappori
(1988, 1992) in which the goods of interest are a composite commodity and the spouses
labor supplies. For my purposes, I take the spouses’ labor supplies as given and thus I
condition the free choice of commodities by some taken values of both labor supplies and
participation. In this way my model approaches to the conditional model of Browning and
Meghir (1991), but I extend their (unitary) conditional model in the collective way so that I
allow for wage eﬀects on commodity demands by virtue of the collective bargaining eﬀects.
As already remarked by Browning and Meghir (1991), the conditional approach I employ
has the advantage that “our conclusions do not depend on us having the correct model
of the determination of labor force participation and hours of work”. This advantage
allow us the use of the basic collective model plus an assumption of existence of two
exclusive commodities to identify the sharing rule in non-participating households. The
same identiﬁcation method has been used by of Browning et al. (1994) but only with
respect to households in which both spouses work full time.
Extended collective models which explicitly model non-participation and identify the
sharing rule from this extended theoretical setting can be seen in Blundell et al. (2001)
and Donni (2001, 2003). These models are extended in the sense that they can identify the
sharing rule in non-participation sets without relying on the assumption of existence of two
exclusive commodities. However, these models do not provide enough evidence about the
pattern of change of the sharing rule across diﬀerent participation regimes. The theoretical
model of Blundell et al. (2001) imposes a priori the existence of two diﬀerent patterns of
the sharing rule: one in the participation regime, and the other in the non-participation
regime. In the same line and from a theoretical perspective, Donni (2001) presents the
identiﬁcation of two sharing rules in either regime. However, Donni (2003) presents an
estimation of a unique sharing rule for both regimes consistent with his theoretical model.
In the conditional model presented here, the answer to the question of whether there
is a unique sharing rule across regimes or a pair of sharing rules in each regime is a matter
2of empirical evidence. Indeed, instead of imposing a particular relationship between the
pair of sharing rules, we can test whether the particular relationship between the pair of
sharing rules imposed by the model of Blundell et al. (2001) holds. Therefore, one of the
contributions of this paper is the ﬁnding of empirical restrictions across regimes (subject
to a particular functional form) to test the null hypothesis of a unique sharing rule.
The conditional methodology used comes out as the simplest way (in the sense that I
do not extend the collective basic model) that has been used under the collective framework
to recover the sharing rule under non-participation in the labor market. This simplicity
arises at the cost of assuming the observability of two exclusive commodities such as men’s
and women’s clothing. The counterpart of this cost is that it allows to test the existence of
a unique sharing rule across regimes and to identify, in the case of a rejection of the test,
the two diﬀerent sharing patterns: one for ‘traditional’ households in which the wife does
not participate and the other one for ‘modern’ households in which the wife participates.
Under the theoretical model assumptions we ﬁnd how several variables, such as the
household income and the labor incomes of the spouses, aﬀect each partner share of total
expenditures and whether these eﬀects are diﬀerent depending upon the wife’s participation
in the labor market. The estimates provide evidence against the income pooling hypothesis
and also against the hypothesis of a unique sharing rule. However, there is no evidence
against some of the collective model properties. The test of the Blundell et al. (2001)
implication of a positive proportionality between the parameters of the two sharing rules
gives a p-value of 4.5 percent. Therefore, we cannot state that any strong evidence exist
to support the proportionality, although we can see that it has a positive sign.
Previous estimates of the eﬀect of wealth and wages on the sharing rule have found
diﬀerent results for diﬀerent countries. In contrast with the results found here concerning
the eﬀect of non-labor income, Blundell et al. (2001), Chiappori et al. (2002) and Donni
(2001) ﬁnd a much larger positive eﬀect of non-labor income on the wife’s share. In line
with the results presented here, Blundell et al. (2001) and Browning et al. (1994) point out
3a positive eﬀect of the wife’s wage on her share. With respect to the eﬀect of the husbands
wage, results found in this paper are in line with those in Donni (2001), in the sense that
an increase in the husband’s wage is shared between the spouses. In short, I ﬁnd that, in
Spanish households, the ‘welfare’ eﬀect, consisting of a transfer to the partner, dominates
the ‘distribution’ eﬀect, consisting of an spouse keeping all of her/his wage increase plus
and extra due to the increase in her/his bargaining power. The net eﬀect results in the
sharing between the spouses of any accrual in wages. In the case of households in which
the wife is outside the labor market, the transfer to the wife caused by an increase in the
husband’s wage is higher than in the case of households with both spouses working full
time.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework.
Section 3 explains the parametric speciﬁcation used for estimating and testing. Section 4
presents the data, estimation method and empirical results . Finally, Section 5 sets out
some concluding remarks.
2. The Theoretical Framework
A. The Model
Following Browning et al. (1994), the model presented is deﬁned under the following
assumptions:
(i) Pareto eﬃcient outcomes that are the result of the decision process between two
agents, the wife and the husband (i = f,m).
(ii) Observability of the amount of total household private expenditures among which
we consider a private Hicksian composite consumption good C, and two exclusive con-
sumption goods (or one assignable good): women’s clothing and men’s clothing, qf,qm.
The distribution of C between the spouses such that C = Cm + Cf is not observed.
(iii) Egoistic preferences over private goods or egoistic and weakly separable prefer-
ences over private and public goods.
4In our conditional framework, among the variables that condition the choice of private
consumption goods there are labor supplies, hf,hm, participation dummies df,dm, and
a vector z of demographics and goods such as durables. With M we denote the total
expenditure in private goods, while Q denotes the total expenditure in public goods. The
household sources of income are labor incomes expressed as products of wages by working
hours, wfhf, wmhm, and non-labor income, y.
Labor supply is a special case of a conditioning good since the corner solution in the
labor supply of the spouses could lead to a switching in the demand system between the
unrationed and rationed systems. Browning and Meghir (1991) allow for the switching of
the demand system in the conditional framework by incorporating ﬁxed costs of participa-
tion in the conditional cost function. In their model, the ﬁxed costs shift only the intercept
of the demand system. However, they also note that these sorts of cost may alter the level
of total expenditure as well as the structure of demand.
Under these assumptions, household behavior must be the solution of the following
program:
maxqf,qm,Cf,Cm µ(δ)Uf(qf,Cf;hf,hm,df,dm,z)+(1−µ(δ))Um(qm,Cm;hf,hm,df,dm,z)
subject to: qf + qm + C = M P
where M = wfhf + wmhm + y − Q.
The existence of a diﬀerentiable function µ(δ) guarantees that a unique, well-deﬁned
outcome exists. Any point of the Pareto frontier can be obtained for some chosen µ such
that a higher value of µ gives more weight to the wife’s preferences compared to the husband
or more ‘power’ to the wife. The distribution of ‘power’ between the husband and the wife
depends on the vector of variables δ which includes commodity prices (set equal to one)
and income, measured by M. Vector δ may include all exogenous variables of the demand
system and any exogenous variable aﬀecting the bargaining position between the spouses
(extra-environmental parameters in the terminology of McElroy (1990) or distribution
5factors in the terminology of Browning et al. (1994)). In particular, wages, including
the potential wages of nonparticipants, are normally considered to aﬀect µ and, in our
case, wages are distribution factors since their eﬀect on the demand system is transmitted
uniquely through the function µ.
The values taken for the spouses labor supplies are such that hm = dm = 1 for men,
that is, the husband always works full time, and hf = 1 if df = 1 or hf = 0 if df = 0
for women, that is, the wife, when she works, always works full time. Hence, we deﬁne
households in either the participation regime (df = 1) or in the non-participation regime
(df = 0).
B. The Sharing Rule Interpretation
Chiappori (1992) shows (by virtue of the Second Welfare Theorem) that the solution
of program P is the solution of the two following individual programs for i = m,f:
maxqi,Ci Ui(qi,Ci;df,z) Pi
subject to: qi + Ci = ϕi(δ)M
where the function ϕ(δ) = ϕf(δ) denotes the proportion of private expenditures received
by the wife, and 1 − ϕ(δ) = ϕm(δ) is the proportion of private expenditures the husband
receives. The function ϕ(δ) represents the “sharing rule”. Given that the sharing rule
may depend on any exogenous variable of the model, the participation dummy can be a
component of δ. The relevant question now is the following: does the conditioning variable
female participation aﬀect the sharing rule to the point of switching its parameters?
Extended collective models discussed in the introduction impose the existence of two
sharing rules in each regime (Blundell et al. (2001) and Donni (2001)) or the existence
of a unique sharing rule for both regimes (Donni (2003)). One of the main objectives
of the present analysis is to test whether there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the sharing
6rule parameters across regimes. For this reason, I do not impose in the model that the
sharing rule must depend upon female participation and that, therefore, such a relation of
dependence is the cause for the switching of the sharing rule across regimes.
I consider the sharing rule to depend only on household wealth, measured by the
amount of household private expenditures, and on wages. Therefore, the sharing rule
can be written as the function ϕ(M,wm,wf). For simplicity, other potential distribution
factors, such as diﬀerences in ages or in levels of education of the spouses, are not included.
3. Parametric Identiﬁcation
I assume a semi-logarithmic functional form for the Engel curves of clothing consumption of
each spouse. The explanatory variables of the Engel curves are the unobserved individual
private expenditures, xi, and the vector z of demographic variables and durables. Omitting
the vector z, the individual Engel curves are represented by the following equations:
qf = af(df) + bf(df)logxf, with xf = Mϕ(M,wf,wm) (1)
qm = am(df) + bm(df)logxm, with xm = M(1 − ϕ(M,wf,wm)) (2)
This modelization allows for the most general eﬀect of the participation dummy on
the parameters of the Engel curves, so that female participation can shift all the parame-
ters. Therefore, the consumption of the two exclusive commodities is represented by the










1logxf if df = 1 (4)
qf = am
0 + bm
0 logxm if df = 0 (5)
qf = am
1 + bm
1 logxm if df = 1 (6)







ψ(M,wf,wm) = 2(α + θlnM + γflnwf + γmlnwm) (8)
The sharing rule is bound between zero and one and takes the equal sharing value,
0.5, for ψ = 0. The constant term α centers the function so that the lower the value of α
the lower the wife’s share is. Parameters θ, γf and γm deﬁne the elasticities of the sharing
rule with respect to non-labor income and wages as the expressions given below.
The accrual of the spouses’ shares caused by a change in non-labor income (increase




= ϕ(1 − ϕ)2θ + ϕ (9)
∂xm
∂M
= −ϕ(1 − ϕ)2θ + (1 − ϕ) (10)
∂xf
∂wi = ϕ(1 − ϕ)2γi + ϕ (11)
∂xm
∂wi = −ϕ(1 − ϕ)2γi + (1 − ϕ) (12)
With respect to the eﬀect of the wife’s potential wage, which does not aﬀect M, the
last summand of the right hand side of expressions (11) and (12) is zero.
The expressions of the income elasticity and wages elasticities of the sharing rule can
be seen in Browning et al. (1994). According to the value taken by the income elasticity
of the wife’s share at the equal sharing point, θ + 1, the wife’s share is a luxury and the
husband’s share a necessity if θ is positive. Conversely, the wife’s share is a necessity and
the man’s share a luxury is θ is negative.
Equations (3) to (6) could be estimated by nonlinear ordinary least squares and the
identiﬁcation of the parameters of the sharing rule would be partly due to non-linearity
8of the speciﬁcation. However, as Chiappori (1988, 1992) shows, non-linearity of the Engel
curves is not a necessary condition to identify the parameters of the sharing rule. In fact,
Chiappori shows that under the basic assumptions, the parameters of the sharing rule are
identiﬁed up to a constant. Accordingly, in the following linearized model, I show that all
the parameters of the sharing rule, with the exception of α, are identiﬁed.
The sharing rule is linearized by taking a Taylor expansion around the equal sharing
point and a logarithmic approximation according to which ln(1+) ' , for  close to zero



























By substituting expressions (13) and (14) into the Engel curves (3) to (6), we obtain
a linear in variables structural form for the Engel curves, whose reduced forms can be
estimated by linear methods. If we add the demographic variables again in the vector z,






















1z if df = 1 (16)
qm = Am
0 + Bm
0 logM + Cm
0 logwf + Dm
0 logwm + Em
0 z if df = 0 (17)
qm = Am
1 + Bm
1 logM + Cm
1 logwf + Dm
1 logwm + Em
1 z if df = 1 (18)
Assuming a priori that female participation does not aﬀect the sharing rule, each of




k for i = m,f and k = 0 or k = 1, can
be expressed as a function of twelve structural parameters ai
k,bi
k,α,θ,γf,γm for i = m,f
and k = 0 or k = 1 (see the system of identifying equations in the Appendix A). In the
identiﬁcation system we see that the intercepts ai
k of the Engel curves and the intercept α
9of the sharing rule are not identiﬁed. The rest of the parameters are not uniquely identiﬁed.
The identiﬁcation system consists then of twelve equations in seven unknowns. Therefore,
the identiﬁcation system implies ﬁve overidentifying restrictions. But then, if we allow
for the switching of the sharing rule across regimes, we have an initial system of sixteen
equations in sixteen unknowns, which shows the same underidentiﬁcation for ai
k and αk
and two overidentifying restrictions for the remaining parameters (twelve equations in ten
unknowns).
The identiﬁcation system corresponding to a unique sharing rule imposes the following






















































i = m,f (R3i)
In the terminology of collective models (Browning and Chiappori (1998)), restric-
tions (DFP0) and (DFP1) result from the Distribution Factor Proportionality property
(DFP). This property holds even in the case in which the sharing rule switches across
regimes. A test of restrictions (DFP0) and (DFP1) allows us to test necessary conditions
of the Pareto eﬃciency assumption. Since our distribution factors are the spouses wages,
the unitary model property income pooling is a particular case of the DFP property when
the ratio Ci
k/Di
k = 1 for i = m,f and k = 0 or k = 1. Income pooling is a necessary
condition in any classical single decision maker model.
Restrictions (R1i) to (R3i) hold when the sharing rule does not depend on female
participation. These restrictions are necessary conditions for a unique sharing rule across
10regimes to exist. A test of a suﬃcient condition for an equal sharing rule across regimes is
provided by the test of the ﬁve overidentifying restrictions of the identiﬁcation system.
4. Evidence from Spanish Data
4.1. Description of the Data
The data used in this analysis are data on household expenditures and have been obtained
from the Spanish expenditures survey “Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiares 1990-91”
(EPF-90)1 . The sample selected consists of couples whose members are less than sixty-six
and with the husband working full time. I assume the couple are the two adult decision-
makers. Among these households, there are 1,509 households in which the wife works full
time and 3,369 in which the wife does not participate in the labor market. (See detailed
sample selection in Table VI).
I allow for the existence of children under the age of seventeen. Although the inclusion
of couples with children is controversial since children can be considered as public goods
and are the main source of preference interdependence between the spouses, I decided
to include couples with children because choosing only childless couples restricts the size
of our sample too much. Part of the public element problem is mitigated by excluding
reported expenditures on children from private expenditures.
To estimate Engel curves for men’s and women’s clothing I use data from EPF-90 on
clothing expenditures by gender, as well as on household private expenditures, on spouses
labor incomes and on household characteristics. I consider the following expenditures to be
private expenditures: food, transport and communications, clothing, personal care, home
entertainment, outside home entertainment, alcohol and tobacco, and a group of other
miscellaneous expenditures. Then, to measure total private expenditures I exclude those
1 Data and documentation are available at the web page of the Department of Economics of the
University Carlos III of Madrid: http://www.eco.uc3m.es/investigacion/index.html]toc4.
11that are considered public goods (children expenditures as well as those for energy, water,
cleaning and housing) from the total current expenditures.
The EPF-90 does not include data on working hours. Agents report whether or not
they work full time and their labor incomes. Assuming, as the theoretical model does,
that everybody working full time works the same amount of annual hours, allows us to
use the spouses labor incomes as explanatory variables of the Engel curves. However, the
study of the distribution of weekly working hours with data of the Spanish Labor Force
Survey (Encuesta de Poblaci´ on Activa) for those who report working full time indicates a
wide distribution of working hours. Therefore, to normalize working hours, we use hourly
wages as labor incomes measure. The hourly wage has been imputed as the ratio of labor
income to the imputed annual working hours. The imputation of working hours has been
done from the Encuesta de Poblaci´ on Activa data on working hours and on individual
characteristics which can be matched to the characteristics of individuals in the EPF-90
data (more details on the methodology of such imputation can be seen in Zamora (2004)).
Sample statistics of men’s and women’s clothing as well as on selected explanatory
variables are shown in Table I.
[Table I around here]
4.2. Econometric Issues
In the estimation of the system formed by the two Engel curves of men’s and women’s
clothing I allow for endogeneity of female participation although it is not a choice in
the theoretical model (see Browning and Meghir (1991)). Then, considering that female
participation switches all the parameters of the Engel curves implies that we have to model
endogenous switching. Moreover, as we need to test the cross-regimes restrictions (R1i),
(R2i) and (R3i), we have to jointly estimate the participation system formed by equations
(16) and (18) and the non-participation system formed by (15) and (17). Therefore, we
12can write a stochastic version of these equations for i = m,f as (see Maddala, (1983)):
qi = dfqi
1 + (1 − df)qi
0 = Xβi




1D)b φ + e (19)
where X is the matrix with all the explanatory variables, βi
1 and βi
0 are vectors of parame-
ters corresponding to the participation and non-participation regimes respectively, b Φ and b φ
are respectively the point estimates of the normal cumulative and probability distribution
functions of the participation equation that has been estimated in a ﬁrst stage, σi
kD is the
covariance between the random disturbances of the participation equation and the Engel
curve in the k regime for k = 0 or k = 1, , and e is a mean zero error that is not related
to participation. The random disturbances of clothing consumptions and of participation
are assumed to follow a trivariate normal. The self-selection parameter (σi
0D − σi
1D) indi-
cates whether there are unobserved gains or losses in clothing consumption of the spouse
i derived from female participation.
Measurement problems of consumption from expenditure data (bulk purchases and
infrequency of purchase) are taken into account. The data available for food are already
corrected by bulk purchases according to the methodology proposed by Pe˜ na and Ruiz-
Castillo (1992). Clothing and the components of private expenditures, with the exception
of transport and communication and alcohol and tobacco, have been corrected by infre-
quency according to the methodology of Meghir and Robin (1992).
Lumpiness and infrequency may induce an endogeneity of the explanatory variable
‘total private expenditures’. Therefore, we have two endogenous explanatory variables
in each equation of the system (19): the logarithm of per capita private expenditures,
and the product of this variable by the predicted probability of female participation, b Φ.
We use four instruments based on income variables to have some overidentiﬁcation: As
a ﬁrst instrument, we use the logarithm of a proxy variable for income that includes all
expenditures on durables and non-durables2 . The second instrument results as the product
2 This variable has been previously used in Deaton et al. (1989) to instrument current expenditure.
13of the ﬁrst instrument by the reported total household income. Finally, the two remaining
instruments are the product of the two previous instruments by b Φ. If we only use functions
of reported income as instruments, we ﬁnd we have a problem of weak instruments because
of the weak relationship between reported income and household private expenditures.
Wages are imputed for husband and for working wives according to the above-described
procedure. When the wife does not participate, her potential wage is predicted from a wage
equation that corrects self-selection from a participation equation (see estimates in Table
VIII). I consider wages as exogenous variables by considering that agents cannot aﬀect
wages once they have decided their labor supply.
The system (19) formed by the reduced form equations corresponding to men’s and
women’s clothing is estimated using the generalized method of moments (GMM). The
income pooling, the distribution factor proportionality and the equal sharing rule restric-
tions are tested upon the basis of these estimates. The Hansen test is applied to the GMM
estimates of each equation separately to test the validity of the instruments.
A minimum distance estimator is used to solve the identiﬁcation system, that is,
estimates for the individual marginal propensities to consume and the sharing rule param-
eters are recovered. Demographic and household characteristics variables are included in
the structural form .
4.3. Results
The reduced form estimates are presented in Table II. The relevant estimates for the
identiﬁcation system are the coeﬃcients of ‘private expenditures’ and of ‘wages’. With
respect to these parameters we observe the following features.
[Table II around here]
Household income elasticities (
∂logq
i
∂logM = Bi/qi) indicate that men’s clothing is a lux-
ury in both regimes, with an income elasticity of approximately 1.3. However, women’s
clothing is a necessity in the non-participation regime (elasticity of 0.8) and a luxury in
14the participation regime (elasticity of 1.9). The men’s wage has a negative eﬀect on men’s
clothing in the non-participation regime. One should bear in mind that this eﬀect is con-
trolled for a measure of household wealth and for the husband level of education whose
eﬀects are large and positive. No signiﬁcant eﬀect of female wages is observed in either
regime.
With respect to the eﬀect of household characteristics and demographic variables on
men’s clothing, it is remarkable that men’s clothing consumption increases substantially
with the number of children. This increase does not seem to be due to the reporting of
children’s clothing into the husband’s clothing, since such an increase happens only for
men’s clothing and just in the non-participation regime. This result for men’s clothing
contrasts with that obtained by Deaton et al. (1989) for adult clothing and for a much
larger sample of Spanish data. They ﬁnd that all the child groups have signiﬁcant negative
coeﬃcients in the adult clothing equation. In my case, I obtain these negative eﬀects of
children on clothing for the case of women’s clothing in the non-participation regime,
although these eﬀects are not precisely estimated. The results in Deaton et al. (1989)
detect non-separabilities among adult clothing and the presence of children. The non-
separability implies that the eﬀect of the child on adult clothing consumption contains
substitution eﬀects. The fact that adult clothing is not demographically separable from
children is not consistent with the model assumption of weak-separability among private
and public goods. Later I discuss how to consider this inconsistency.
The patterns of complementarities or substitutabilities between durables and men’s
clothing change across regimes. While the non-participating household sacriﬁces men’s
clothing in order to buy more durables other than the car, the participating household
sacriﬁces men’s clothing in order to buy the car. However, the remaining durables are
complements of men’s clothing.
In the case of women’s clothing, apart from regional ﬁxed eﬀects, the unique signiﬁcant
eﬀects at an individual level are those of private expenditures and home ownership. Home
15ownership favors the consumption of clothing of the non-participating wife but apparently
the participating wife sacriﬁces her clothing expenditures to pay the mortgage.
There is not evidence of selectivity, that is, unobserved gains in clothing derived
from participation are not taken into account when the household decides on the wife’s
participation.
Table III presents the test of the reduced form model restrictions. By testing such
restrictions we conclude that we reject only the unitary model property of income pooling.
This rejection is due to the result of the bargaining decision process in households in
which the wife does not participate. Distribution Factor Proportionality is not rejected.
Therefore, there is no evidence against the collective theoretical setting. Equal sharing
rule restrictions (R1i), (R2i) and (R3i) are not rejected but this is not suﬃcient to assert
that the sharing rule does not depend upon female participation.
[Table III around here]
Household composition eﬀects that result from the inclusion of children eﬀects cause
problems of identiﬁcation of the structural model. The identiﬁcation system includes re-
strictions of equality between the parameters of the reduced form and the structural form
corresponding to demographic and household characteristics variables. It happens that
the restrictions concerning this equality between the parameters of household composition
in the reduced and structural form systems are rejected. As a consequence, the two overi-
dentifying restrictions of the identiﬁcation system corresponding to the general case of two
sharing rules are rejected (see estimates of the structural form in Table VII). Therefore,
the estimated structural model which includes children’s eﬀects is not consistent with the
theoretical model. Nevertheless, when we eliminate household composition eﬀects from
the structural Engel curves (3) to (6), the estimates turn out to be consistent with the
theoretical model so that we do not reject the two overidentifying restrictions of the model
with two sharing rules.
The structural parameters estimates of the model without household composition
16eﬀects are shown in Table IV and Table V. Table IV presents the sharing rule parameters
estimates and Table V presents the parameters estimates for the structural Engel curves
(3) to (6) (regional eﬀects are included in the estimation but omitted in the presentation
of Table V).
We reject the ﬁve overidentifying restrictions of the model with a unique sharing
rule but we do not reject the two overidentifying restrictions implied by the model with
two sharing rules. Thus, we ﬁnd evidence against a unique sharing rule3 but not against
the existence of two sharing rules. Furthermore, as the model in Blundell et al. (2001)
postulates, when we allow the switching of the sharing rule across regimes we ﬁnd a positive
relationship between the parameters of the sharing rule in the non-participation regime
and those of the sharing rule in the participation regime. However, we reject the Wald test
upon the null hypothesis of proportionality or equality among the three ratios formed by






This Wald statistic takes a value of 6.209 which for a Chi-square of two degrees of freedom
gives a p-value of 4.5 percent.
[Table IV around here]
Estimates of the sharing rule parameters indicate that the wife’s share is a neces-
sity with an income elasticity close to zero in both regimes. This implies that when the
household non-labor income increases a thousand pesetas, this causes a very small accrual
of the wife’s share (in particular, 69 Spanish pesetas in the non-participation regime and
no perceptible increase in the participation regime). An increase in the husband’s labor
income is shared between the spouses in approximately the same amount, although the
‘welfare’ eﬀect or transfer to the wife is higher in the non-participation regime. There is
no perceptible eﬀect of an increase in the labor market opportunities of the non-working
3 Evidence against a unique sharing rule is found in both cases, including or not household composition
eﬀects. However, when we eliminate household composition eﬀects, there is a problem of convergence of
the structural model with a unique sharing rule (in particular for the parameter b
f
1 of the Engel curve in
expression(4)).
17wife in her share. On the contrary, the increase in the market wage of the wife increases
both spouses shares in the same amount.
[Table V around here]
Estimates of the structural Engel curves (3) to (6) show that individual marginal
propensities to consumption are diﬀerent to the household marginal propensities to con-
sumption estimated in the reduced form. According to the estimates of the individual
marginal propensities to consumption, men’s clothing is a necessity (income elasticity
equal to 0.68) and women’s clothing a luxury (income elasticity equal to 3.53) in the
non-participation regime. Income-elasticities in the participation regime are not precisely
estimated.
5. Concluding Remarks
The literature on collective models has dealt with the identiﬁcation of the intra-household
process under non-participation of one of the spouses (Blundell et al. (2001) and Donni
(2001, 2003)). Notwithstanding, the focus of this literature is not on the diﬀerences in
the intra-household distribution between participating and non-participating households.
In this paper, I give an empirical answer to whether these diﬀerences exist and how they
operate. My empirical answer is based on the identiﬁcation of the intra-household dis-
tribution from interior solutions of the household allocation model of consumption. For
this reason, the identiﬁcation under non-participation obliges us to make an additional
assumption which consists of the observability of both spouses’ clothing as goods that
are consumed exclusively by each spouse. Such an assumption is considered more re-
strictive than those assumed in the extended collective models cited above which achieve
identiﬁcation by modeling the corner solution in the leisure choice of one of the spouses.
Nevertheless, the restrictiveness of the clothing exclusivity assumption is mitigated by the
characteristics of the data available since there is an exhaustive reporting of the type of
clothing by gender. In addition to reporting expenditures on adult men’s and women’s
18clothing shoes, the respondent to the survey reports expenditures on baby’s clothing and
other types of unclassiﬁed clothing.
The allowance of couples with children in our sample appears to be problematic. This
problem arises through the eﬀects of household composition in our structural model, in
such a way that the inclusion of household composition in the spouses Engel curves is
not consistent with the theoretical model. However, the structural estimates obtained
after the elimination of children’s eﬀects appear to be robust to the inclusion of such
eﬀects, although the allowance of children’s eﬀects causes imprecision in the estimation of
structural parameters.
With respect to the consideration of families in which the wife does not participate
in the labor market as traditional families versus modern families in which the wife par-
ticipates, we ﬁnd the counterintuitive result. It happens that there is more pooling of
resources in modern than in traditional families, in contrast to which sociology says about
traditional families. In this sense, we ﬁnd evidence of stronger bargaining between the
spouses in traditional families than in moderns families because the rejection of the income
pooling hypothesis is due to the behavior inside of the traditional families. Moreover, the
sharing of any accrual in the spouses labor incomes is more unevenly distributed between
the spouses in traditional families than in modern families.
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Identiﬁcation System
The identiﬁcation system assuming there is a unique sharing rule consists of the following










































Assuming two diﬀerent sharing rules gives a similar identiﬁcation system where the
parameters of the sharing rule have the subscript k indicating each participation regime.
4 There are 73 additional restrictions in each regime which equal parameters of demographic and
household characteristic variables between reduced and structural forms.
22  23
APPENDIX B: TABLES 
 
Table I. Sample Statistics 
  Non Participation Regime  Participation regime  Mean Diff. 
  # 3369 obs.  # 1509 obs.  Ho: m0-m1=0 
  Mean (m0)  Std. Dev  Mean (m1)  Std. Dev  t-ratio 
Expenditures 
1 on husband's clothing  67.645  (120.648)  90.970  (146.090)  -5.83* 
Expenditues on wife's clothing  66.758  (116.326)  115.642  (242.149)  -9.52* 
Private Expenditures/hhold. Size  362.543  (208.424)  500.963  (286.087)  -18.99* 
Husband's wage  0.770  (0.513)  0.848  (0.438)  -5.14* 
Wife's wage  0.289  (0.139)  0.605  (0.371)  -43.14* 
Hhold. Size  3.696  (1.077)  3.495  (1.017)  6.13* 
Number children  aged 0-3 /hhold size  0.083  (0.136)  0.083  (0.139)  -0.11 
Number children aged 4-8 /hhold size  0.126  (0.155)  0.127  (0.157)  -0.20 
Number children aged 9-14 /hhold size  0.158  (0.183)  0.135  (0.174)  4.25* 
Number children aged 15-16/hhold size  0.037  (0.093)  0.028  (0.082)  3.40* 
Husband's age  39.278  (9.182) 36.304 (7.043) 11.19* 
Husband's Primary Education  0.234  (0.424)  0.213  (0.410)  1.60 
Husband's Secondary Education  0.182  (0.386)  0.281  (0.450)  -7.83* 
Husband's Higher Education  0.096  (0.294)  0.269  (0.444)  -16.13* 
Wife's Primary Education  0.271  (0.444)  0.227  (0.419)  0.00 
Wife's Secondary Education  0.142  (0.349)  0.262  (0.440)  -10.23* 
Wife's Higher Education  0.045  (0.206)  0.283  (0.451)  -25.35* 
Urban Residence  0.538  (0.499)  0.629  (0.483)  -5.97* 
Executive 0.085  (0.279)  0.247  (0.432)  -15.71* 
Blue collar worker  0.627  (0.484)  0.528  (0.499)  6.55* 
Businessman 0.132  (0.338)  0.108  (0.311)  2.32* 
Home Ownership  0.726  (0.446)  0.714  (0.452)  0.82 
Car Ownership  0.834  (0.372)  0.920  (0.272)  -8.02* 
Number of durables  9.484  (2.950)  10.987  (3.344)  -15.76* 
N o t e s         
1. Expenditures and hourly wages on thousands pesetas         
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Table II. Reduced Form Estimates 
  Engel Curve of Husband's Clothing      Engel Curve of Wife's Clothing     
  βo 
t-
ratio  β1 
t-
ratio  β1-βo 
t -
ratio  βo  
t -
ratio  β1 
t-
ratio  β1-βo 
t -
ratio 
Log(Private Expenditures/hhold. size)  85.804 16.51*  126.795 11.99*  40.995  2.82*  53.896  6.36*  221.036 12.81*  167.140  7.05* 
Log(husband's wage)  -12.632  -2.45*  1.326 0.16  13.957 1.15  11.171 1.33  -13.006  -0.94  -24.177  -1.23 
Log(wife's wage)  1.693 0.33  1.591 0.21  -0.102  -0.01  -5.635  -0.67  13.871 1.15  19.506 1.04 
Log(hhold. size)  -56.013 -1.57  0.107 0.001  56.126  0.51  79.158  1.36 -151.543 -1.11  -230.701 -1.29 
Number children  aged 0-3 /hhold size  138.042 2.5*  32.566 0.29  -105.491  -0.69  -79.018  -0.88 229.127 1.24  308.145 1.24 
Number children aged 4-8 /hhold size  187.885  3.28*  65.448 0.54  -122.445  -0.75  -55.105  -0.59 339.118 1.71  394.223 1.49 
Number children aged 9-14 /hhold size  186.900  3.26*  41.400 0.33  -145.510  -0.87  -90.448  -0.97 335.741 1.63  426.190 1.57 
Number children aged 15-16/hhold size  169.509  2.92*  157.340 1.19 -12.177  -0.07  -62.572  -0.66 414.332 1.92  476.904 1.68 
Husband's age  -1.116 -0.56  -3.587 -0.87  -2.471 -0.45  -5.374 -1.65  0.641  0.09  6.015  0.67 
Squared Husband's age  0.014 0.58  0.038 0.74  0.024 0.36  0.064 1.66  -0.009  -0.11  -0.073  -0.67 
Husband's Primary Education  -3.765 -0.6 18.504  1.14 22.270  1.04  12.592  1.22 -27.079  -1.03  -39.671  -1.14 
Husband's Secondary Education  30.768  4.33* -29.171  -1.89 -59.935  -2.85*  17.000 1.47  -20.774  -0.83  -37.774  -1.1 
Husband's Higher Education  60.296  5.75* -36.479  -2.09* -96.775  -3.82*  23.420 1.37  -17.993  -0.63  -41.412  -1 
Wife's Primary Education  7.666  0.9  -7.758 -0.31  -15.417 -0.47  -3.605 -0.26  17.590  0.43  21.194  0.4 
Wife's Secondary Education  -9.765  -0.59  13.555 0.40  23.326 0.48  20.410 0.76  11.197 0.20  -9.213  -0.12 
Wife's Higher Education  15.381  0.4 -11.026  -0.23 -26.401  -0.33  41.514 0.65  53.752 0.69  12.238 0.09 
Urban Residence  -12.718  -3.41* 24.225  3.26* 36.940  3.6  -4.766  -0.78 -20.745  -1.71  -15.980  -0.96 
Executive  3.443  0.39 28.915  2.49* 25.478  1.39  14.413  1 -31.699  -1.68  -46.112  -1.55 
Blue collar worker  1.949 0.37  0.491 0.04  -1.458 -0.1  -4.927  -0.58  1.646 0.09  6.573 0.27 
Businessman  -9.667  -1.45  5.050 0.34  14.720 0.74  -15.441  -1.42  -0.294  -0.01  15.147 0.47 
Home Ownership  2.397 0.57  3.683 0.48  1.285 0.12  13.383  1.96*  -26.314  -2.11*  -39.697  -2.24* 
Car Ownership  -3.092  -0.57 -41.287  -2.99* -38.196  -2.13*  -14.449  -1.63  16.538 0.73  30.987 1.06 
Number of durables  -3.187  -4.33*  3.596  2.94*  6.783 3.8*  1.500 1.25  1.593 0.80  0.093 0.03 
Intercept  -373.623 -6.24*  -663.962 -4.87*  -290.383  -1.67  -248.579 -2.54* -1283.258 -5.77*  -1034.680 -3.65* 
Selectivity term  -25.586  -0.38         150.326  1.38        
F-test for 16 Region fixed effects  80.82*       70.86*   31.85*       40.99*   
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments) Chi(2) 
1:                 
Men's Clothing:  0.177                    
Women's Clothing  4.190                    
N o t e s :                       
1. There are two overidentification restrictions in each Engel curve 
`*' refers to statistical significance of the two sides test of significance at 5% level    25
 
Table III. Reduced Form Model Restrictions 
  Wald test  degrees of freedom  p-value 
Income Pooling  11.970  4  0.017576 
Distribution Factor Proportionality  0.612  2  0.736235 





Table IV. Sharing Rule Estimates 
1 
  Unique Sharing Rule  Two Sharing Rules 
   Non  Participation  Participation 
θ  -0.983832* -0.861546*  -1.023338* 
 (0.00586)  (0.05762)  (0.09920) 
γm  0.028559* 0.262676*  0.025685* 
 (0.00809)  (0.10048)  (0.01062) 
γf  0.005776 0.021801  -0.02601 
 (0.00455)  (0.03479)  (0.08335) 
Derivatives of the wife's share 
2 (evaluated at equal sharing)   
∂x
f/∂M  0.00808* 0.06923*  -0.011669 
 (0.00293)  (0.02881)  (0.04960) 
∂x
f/∂wm  0.51428* 0.63134*  0.51284* 
 (0.00404)  (0.05024)  (0.00531) 
∂x
f/∂wf  0.50289* 0.01059  0.48699* 
 (0.00228)  (0.01740)  (0.04168) 
Test of Overidentification Restrictions     
  Chi-Squared (5)  Chi-Squared (2)   
 18.824708  0.665909   
p-value 0.002072  0.716803   
Notes:      
1 The structural form includes all the demographic variables except variables of household 
composition 
2. These derivatives are estimated according to equations (9) and (11) at φ=0.5 























Table V. Structural form of the individual Engel Curves 
1 
  Husband's Engel Curve for his clothing  Wife's Engel Curve for her clothing 
  Non-participation Participation  Non-participation Participation 






i  46.1367 14.68*  -0.4645  -0.48  235.9928 2.76*  490.7633  0.31 
Husband's  age  3.4424  0.39 18.9867 0.57  17.4630 1.51  0.5769 0.09 
Squared  Husband's  age  1.8126 0.35 -4.3703  -0.09 23.8318  1.39 -0.0083  -0.10 
Husband's Primary Ed.  -9.5916  -1.44  24.4107  3.29*  -4.2180  -0.31  -28.7887  -1.10 
Husband's Secondary Ed.  2.5412  0.60  28.6840  2.48*  19.9994  0.74  -21.7646  -0.87 
Husband's  Higher  Ed.  -2.9898 -0.55  0.6680 0.06  40.8387 0.64 -18.8657  -0.67 
Wife's Primary Ed.  -3.1956  -4.36*  5.0234  0.34  -4.7771  -0.78  19.1553  0.47 
Wife's  Secondary  Ed.  -4.1298 -0.45  3.5975 0.47  14.4116 1.00 12.5176 0.23 
Wife's Higher Ed.  32.4196  2.38*  -41.4398  -3.0*  -4.9600  -0.58  55.3695  0.72 
Urban  Residence  -46.6791 -3.36*  3.6149 2.96*  -15.4224 -1.42 -20.7000 -1.71 
Executive  -15.5952 -1.52 51.9328 3.13  13.4183 1.95 -31.7549  -1.68 
Blue collar worker  55.2581  3.79*  -11.9284  -0.40  -14.4244  -1.63  1.6893  0.09 
Businessman 6.4089  1.04  5.3451  0.23  1.4982  1.25  -0.3004  -0.01 
Home Ownership  22.6392  3.17*  33.2848  1.42  16.0054  1.08  -26.3349  -2.1* 
Car  Ownership  -13.4335 -1.61  -2.5315  -0.09  30.2254 1.36 16.5005 0.73 
Number of durables  3.4079  0.45  29.9857  2.27*  -38.0999  -1.68  1.5977  0.80 
N o t e s :              
1. Includes all demographic and regional variables except household composition variables. The estimation 

































Table VI. Sample Selection 
Couples, with or without children aged less than 17,  in which the man and the 
woman are less than 66 years old 
6694
If the man works more than 13 hours per week, he declares positive labour income, 
and it can be imputed his weekly working hours  5307
Dropped observations: 
If the woman works but does not declare income  38
If there are inconsistencies in the type of employment declared by the woman 
and the relationship with the economic activity  273
If the woman does not work but she declares some labour income  50
If the woman reports working part-time  68
Sample selected  4946
Households in the participation regime  1509
Households in the non-participation regime  3369
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Table VII. Structural Form Estimates including household composition 
Sharing Rule               
  Non-participation  Participation         
θ  -0.6825 -1.0013        
  (0.1686) (0.0030)        
γm  0.2456 0.0316        
  (0.0893) (0.7680)        
γf  -0.0066 -4.1188        
  (0.0118) (4.0703)        
Test  of  Overidentification  Restrictions            
Chi-Squared  (2)  6.6122          
p-value  0.0367          
  Husband's Engel Curve for his clothing  Wife's Engel Curve for her clothing 
 Non-participation  Participation  Non-participation Participation 
Variable Parameter  t-ratio  Parameter t-ratio Parameter  t-ratio  Parameter t-ratio
ln x
i  50.6119 8.45 12.7786 1.58 166.5148 1.58  -7.9399 -1.06
Log(hhold. size)  62.0472 5.95 0.0458 0.90 -123.0241 -1.33  -178.3514 -1.31
Children  aged 0-3 /hhold size  7.0513 0.85 12.3576 0.77 -93.8309 -1.00  269.4999 1.46
Children aged 4-8 /hhold size  -10.0505 -0.61 -32.4801 -2.12 -5.3700 -1.65  380.2270 1.92
Children aged 9-14 /hhold size  11.1900 0.29 -39.1346 -2.26 0.0629 1.64  377.3791 1.84
Children aged 15-16/hhold size  -12.7458 -3.42 -6.7082 -0.27 13.4463 1.30  454.9096 2.11
Husband's age  3.7719 0.43 16.5600 0.49 17.4701 1.51  0.5111 0.08
Squared Husband's age  2.0783 0.40 -3.2559 -0.07 23.8457 1.39  -0.0070 -0.08
Husband's Primary Education  -9.5849 -1.44 24.3495 3.28 -3.7546 -0.27  -28.5726 -1.08
Husband's Secondary Education  2.9268 0.70 29.3781 2.54 20.3403 0.76  -21.5780 -0.86
Husband's Higher Education  -3.2808 -0.61 0.8922 0.08 40.4947 0.64  -18.6379 -0.66
Wife's Primary Education  -3.1235 -4.26 5.2386 0.35 -4.7725 -0.78  17.8448 0.43
Wife's Secondary Education  -3.2480 -0.36 3.0859 0.40 14.4917 1.01  11.9277 0.22
Wife's Higher Education  32.8339 2.41 -40.5076 -2.94 -4.8954 -0.57  55.6404 0.72
Urban Residence  -46.1691 -3.32 3.5087 2.87 -15.4208 -1.42  -20.7149 -1.71
Executive  -15.9204 -1.55 50.4832 3.04 13.5121 1.96  -31.5862 -1.67
Blue collar worker  55.2769 3.79 -13.2532 -0.45 -14.4951 -1.64  1.7438 0.10
Businessman  6.4003 1.04 5.4038 0.23 1.5157 1.26  -0.2481 -0.01
Home Ownership  22.5759 3.16 32.5596 1.39 16.2197 1.09  -26.4593 -2.12
Car Ownership  -12.9884 -1.56 -2.3879 -0.09 30.3261 1.36  16.7270 0.74
Number of durables  3.7978 0.50 29.9594 2.27 -37.9759 -1.67  1.5719 0.79
Aragon  21.0721 2.26 -13.9073 -0.90 19.3400 1.15  -9.5909 -0.35
Asturias  -4.5648 -0.53 47.3350 3.18 54.0194 2.27  34.7236 0.72
Baleares  -9.1486 -0.87 19.3247 1.27 1.0688 0.11  27.7599 0.73
Canarias  -24.3422 -2.27 -10.0743 -0.46 5.9304 0.51  -38.0831 -0.99
Cantabria  -27.9121 -2.06 26.5912 1.62 28.8585 2.12  -15.3864 -0.35
Castilla-Leon  14.2820 1.73 -3.0280 -0.16 16.6113 1.35  29.4087 1.36
Castilla-Mancha  -12.9494 -0.93 44.2452 1.93 26.7690 1.76  59.8068 2.36
Cataluña  127.8952 12.12 136.0039 5.36 -14.0039 -0.99  -61.3483 -2.52
Com. Valenciana  0.2051 0.02 -23.2126 -1.49 14.4246 0.84  2.1444 0.09
Extremadura  2.7701 0.48 29.7238 1.39 -2.1034 -0.12  -66.1043 -1.84
Galicia  -110.1928 -1.54 53.7377 6.34 68.4082 3.09  43.2462 1.62
Madrid  198.6745 2.14 11.2199 1.34 6.0251 0.45  -35.5781 -1.12
Murcia  234.5859 2.30 -5.9655 -0.71 0.2461 0.01  -8.1419 -0.22
Navarra  212.7123 1.99 98.9870 1.72 221.3035 12.82  -44.4430 -1.07
País Vasco  324.2900 2.82 -112.6662 -1.27 -13.2783 -0.96  -11.0579 -0.44
Rioja  -4.1201 -1.01 -87.9776 -0.95 14.1575 1.18  62.6387 1.80
   29
 
Table VIII. Female Wage and Participation Equations 
Participation Equation      Wage Equation     
 Coef.  t-ratio    Coef.  t-ratio 
Log(Husband's Wage)  -0.3796  -8.60  Woman's age  0.1085  5.54 
Husband's working hours  -0.0130  -2.22  Squared woman's age  -0.0013  -5.58 
Woman's age  0.1082  3.14  Woman's Primary Education  0.2674  0.97 
Squared woman's age  -0.0018  -4.01  Woman's Secondary Education  0.8129  3.05 
Husband's age  -0.0453  -1.26  Woman's Higher Education  0.5139  1.99 
Square of Husband's age  0.0005  1.21  Woman's age* Primary Education  0.0033  0.41 
Woman's Primary Education  -0.0506  -0.16  Woman's age* Secondary Ed.  -0.0025  -0.33 
Woman's Secondary Education  -0.0835  -0.24  Woman's age* Higher Education  0.0229  3.18 
Woman's Higher Education  0.1536  0.36  Intercept  -3.6532  -8.99 
Husband's Primary Education  0.9242  2.72       
Husband's Secondary Education  0.8163  2.36  rho  0.2647   
Husband's  Higher  Education  1.2074  2.96   (0.070)  
Woman's age* Primary Education  0.0092  0.98  sigma  0.6788   
Woman's age* Secondary Education  0.0244  2.42    (0.015)   
Woman's age* Higher Education  0.0401  3.32  LR(rho=0)  10.35*   
Husband's age* Primary Education  -0.0240  -2.60       
Husband's age* Secondary Education  -0.0178  -1.90       
Husban's age* Higher Education  -0.0246  -2.29       
Number of children aged 4-8  -0.3631  -8.17       
Number of children aged 0-3  -0.1322  -3.97       
Number of children aged 9-14  -0.0715  -2.33       
Number of children aged 15-16  -0.0010  -0.02       
Regional Unemployment  -0.0138  -6.56       
Intercept -0.7008  -1.17       
 
 